Abstract:
Together with a series of related ECJ cases (Viking, Rüffert), the Laval case became famous as a new display of the struggle between economic freedoms and social rights in the EU. But the European controversy is only one part of the story. Focusing on the Laval case, this article goes back to the place where it all started -Sweden -and tries to shed light on the missing link between the European controversy over posted workers and the challenges that the Swedish labour model is currently facing. The Swedish labour relations system has now to cope with legal uncertainty while the government, the employers and the Trade Unions are increasingly struggling over labour regulation. Beyond its juridical aspects, the Laval case is thus a landmark political event, as it unveils and increases the turmoil of the Swedish autonomous labour relations. It thus displays a new opportunity for reforming industrial relations and labour regulations in Sweden, in a time when they are as much pressured at home as they are admired abroad.
Résumé: L'affaire Laval, liée à une série d'affaires de la CJCE (Viking, Rüffert), a été rendue célèbre à travers l'Europe comme étant un nouvel avatar des contradictions entre libertés économiques et droits sociaux. Mais la dimension européenne n'est qu'une partie de la controverse et cet article met en lumière les liens entre d'une part les débats européens sur les travailleurs détachés et d'autre part les enjeux qu'affronte le modèle suédois de relations industrielles. Au-delà de ses aspects juridiques, l'affaire Laval est un évènement politique majeur en Suède, puisqu'elle met en exergue et accentue les difficultés du système autonome de régulation du marché du travail par les partenaires sociaux. Elle offre en effet de nouvelles opportunités pour réformer les relations industrielles et les règlementations salariales, elles-mêmes qui sont autant menacées en Suède qu'admirées à l'étranger.

THE LAVAL CASE AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 1
In the end of 2004, Swedish Unions implemented a collective action against the Latvian construction company Laval because it temporarily posted Latvian workers to Sweden without signing any local collective agreement, setting up among others the wage level. Laval sued the Trade Unions for discrimination against foreign workers. The Swedish labour Court then referred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which ruled that the blockade was disproportionately infringing the Community provisions for free movement of workerseven though the fight against social dumping "may constitute an overriding reason of public interest 2 ". The Court stressed that one cannot impose an obligation on foreign service providers to respect any working standards which would go beyond the minimum standards set by the Posting of Workers Directive (PWD 3 ). The collective action was thus deemed illegal, since Sweden does not have any legislation on a national minimum wage.
While the Laval case has strongly contributed to the heated debate over the future of a "social Europe", it seems useful to cast a first glance at its impacts on the Swedish labour relations and collective agreement system. Even though the domestic consequences of this decision are still unsettled, we argue that the Laval case has already impacted the Swedish labour relations -mainly by affecting the strategic environment of domestic actors. Building upon Europeanization studies, our research design follows a "bottom-up" pattern, as it checks how EC treaty rules and the interpretations that the ECJ makes of it change the opportunity structures for labour market reforms at domestic level (Olsen, 2002) . This paper puts forward the agenda-setting dimension of European integration and relies upon the assumption that this process does not prevent national institutions or actors from making creative usages of the European changes (including the possibility to accommodate or avoid them; Jacquot and Woll, 2003) . Indeed, a number of social scientists already pointed out the fact that actors can adapt domestic policies and produce change rather independently from pressures arising from institutional misfit. As underlined by Mark Thatcher, "some actors may well already be seeking reform (…) . Thus, from an actor perspective, EU requirements may not be a 'pressure' but rather an opportunity" (Thatcher, 2004) .
Referring to the Laval case, we argue that the European integration brings about legal pressures and political opportunities to reframe the power-balance between social partners and to review national labour regulations. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the Laval case itself and the controversies it triggered in Europe (1). In order to better understand what is at stake for the future of the Swedish labour model, we will then investigate the domestic background of Laval case (2) and the opportunities for reform that the judgement created in this particular context (3). 
THE APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS TO POSTED WORKERS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST "SOCIAL DUMPING" WITHIN THE EU
According to the "law on workers' participation in decisions" (MBL 4 ), Sweden displays a peculiar system of industrial relations which mainly relies on collective agreements (kollektivavtalssystemet 5 ). Collective agreements belong to the field of private law, "somewhere between law and contracts" (Olsson, 2007) . The overall pattern of the Swedish labour model dates back from the Sältsjöbaden agreement which paved the way in 1938 for tripartite industrial relations featuring strong and consensus-oriented social partners. Beside a strong commitment to a comprehensive and costly Welfare State, this system of industrial relations allowed the pursuit of a solidaristic wage policy together with a low-inflatory and productivist industrial policy (according to the Rehn-Meidner model, solidaristic wage policies move manpower from "sunset" to "sunrise" jobs; Gould, 2001) . Fritz Scharpf notes that the system instituted by the "peace agreement" of Sältsjöbaden allowed Sweden to score highest on average wage level and equalization, with a comparatively low level of labour conflicts (Scharpf, 1991) . This well-known labour market model has evolved long before Sweden's membership to the EU. The central bargaining system broke down in the 1980s and social negotiations between the Unions and the employers are since then giving birth to sector and firm-based agreements on working conditions and wages (Jochem, 2000) . Despite these major changes, the State authorities stick to a careful "hands off" policy, leaving labour market regulation to social partners and thus avoiding any comprehensive national legislation about minimum wage. The lowest wages are called ingångslön or grundlön (entry-wage or basicwage). They are set up at local level and may vary from one industry to the other 6 . In fact, "entry-wages" are often directed to inexperienced workers and they are nothing more than a virtual starting point for further negotiations. There is nothing like a minimum wage in Sweden, there are only negotiated ones. Branch-wide and firm-based collective agreements covered about 90% of all the workers in 2007 and the right to take industrial actions is a central feature of this system 7 . Indeed, the wage level depends on negotiations and on legitimate measures of industrial action such as boycotts if negotiations break down (Merghi, 2006) . This specific institutional nexus is only partly shared with Denmark and creates a specific "autonomous collective agreements model", as Ahlberg, Bruun and Malmberg call it (Ahlberg et al., 2006) . The Laval case challenged precisely the compatibility of those arrangements with EC law in the context of cross-border labour mobility. conclude an "application agreement" (hängavtal 10 ) to the collective convention for the building sector. A number of meetings occurred between Byggnads and the representative for Baltic/Laval until contacts eventually collapsed on the 15 th of September 2004 11 . As usual, wage negotiations were the most controversial item of the negotiation. No agreement could be reached, as Laval wanted to fix pay terms at SEK 109 per hour (on the basis of the legal entry-wage mentioned above), whereas Byggnads demanded at least SEK 145, a level which was said to be in line with the average wage level in the Stockholm region for building undertakings (based on publicly available quarterly statistics; Gerhardsson, 2006) . Usually, Swedish labour relations provide that the existing branch convention has to be signed first, laying down the basic requirements concerning unemployment insurance, safety at work, working hours and other legal conventions 12 . Wage negotiations must take place at a local level, only once the parties agreed upon the branch convention. During this phase, the Unions are bound to a 'social peace' clause (fredsplikt) and cannot take any collective action against the employer
A brief presentation of the Laval case
13 . Yet, the negotiations between Laval and Byggnads were plagued by mutual distrust and Laval refused to sign a collective agreement without any preliminary agreement on wage level. Laval obtained these negotiations to be performed jointly and simultaneously. This explains why collective negotiations usually do not end up in such a deadlock as they did in Vaxholm. When the negotiations collapsed altogether mainly because of the wage issue, Laval entered into an alternative collective agreement with the Latvian Trade Union of Construction Workers, to which 65% of the posted workers were affiliated. According to the Swedish legislation, the Swedish Union denied the relevance of a Latvian collective agreement, as the work has to be performed in Sweden. As Laval refused to sign a collective agreement with Byggnads, the Union implemented industrial actions on the 2 nd of November 2004, blocking the access to the building site and depriving it from all supplies. The electricians Trade Union (Elektrikerförbundet) participated to sympathy actions, helping Byggnads to blockade the site. A proceeding was then brought by Laval to the Swedish labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) on the 7 th of December to obtain, first, a declaration that the collective action blockading Laval's worksites is unlawful, second, an order that such action should cease, and, third, an order that the Trade Unions pay compensation for the loss suffered by Laval. The Swedish Arbetsdomstolen referred the case to the European Court of Justice on the 15 th of September 2005 14 . A few weeks before, Laval's Swedish affiliated company was declared bankrupt and the posted workers returned to Latvia. The building of the school was later taken on by a Swedish company who signed the collective agreement and paid the workers about SEK 160 per hour. The Laval case raised in the first place a prejudicial question about the right of Unions to take industrial actions against a foreign employer in order to get him to sign a local collective agreement, in the context of EU rules on freedom of movement to provide services 15 . Byggnads argued that the question asked to the Court is not relevant because it neglects the principle of subsidiarity by implying that EC law can restrict the application of collective 10 "Hängavtal" refers to the type of collective agreement signed with employers who are not members of the Swedish employers' federation. They are a way for Trade Union to fight social dumping by applying to nonaffiliated companies the same conditions to those applying to the whole branch. 11 "Osakert om om facket har rätten på sin sida", Dagens Nyheter, 02-12-2004 12 In the present case, the building branch convention has been signed by Byggnads and by the employers' organisation, Sveriges Byggindustrier 16 . The bottom line of the judgement is that the Swedish system does not fit to this legal framework, and thereby does not provide clear and predictable rules for foreign providers. The Directive 96/71/EC was transposed into Swedish law by the act on posted workers passed by the Riksdag on the 9 th of December 1999 17 . All items referring to the terms and conditions of employment listed by the PWD thus apply in Sweden, save for the minimum pay rates which continue to be determined by collective agreements (Merghi, 2006) . This way to set up wages is not infringing the Directive, as long as it displays non discriminatory rules. Yet, the Court pointed out that Sweden does not have a legal or regulatory system allowing the collective agreements to be considered as automatically generally applicable ('erga omnes' effect). Therefore, as long as all the local companies are not bound to a collective agreement, Swedish Trade Unions cannot compel foreign employers to do so. Beside the absence of minimal wage and the lack of a general application of collective agreements, the Court noticed that several conditions included in the collective agreement proposed by Byggnads were not in line with the Directive on posted workers, such as the requirement for the employer to pay to Byggnads a fee amounting to 1.5% of the wages bill (Granskningsavgift) and to subscribe to an insurance (AFA försäkringar 18 ; Ismal, 2007) . The industrial action pursued by Byggnads against Laval was thus discriminatory with regard to EC treaty rules, given that Byggnads' claims exceeded the minimal working conditions listed by the directive ( §85). Having clearly stated that LO-Byggnads' collective action against Laval did not fall outside of the scope of article 49 EC ( §51 19 ) and exceeded the minimum conditions led by the PWD, the ECJ then turned to a less limpid reasoning about the legality of the collective action with regard to EC free movement rules. The ambiguity of the judgment is striking: on the one hand, the Court recognizes the right to take collective action as a fundamental right ( §95), but on the other hand it has to be proved proportionate and compatible with EC law. Any infringement to the freedom of movement must thus be justified by "overriding reasons of public interest" ( §101 & 103). As regards LO-Byggnads' industrial action, the Court considers that such action in the form of a blockade of sites constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services, which is disproportionate with regard to the public interest aim of protecting workers. The second part of the judgment concerns the compatibility between the EC law and the Swedish labour law which regulates more specifically the provisions for legal collective actions against foreign companies 20 . As mentioned above, the article 42 of the MBL prohibits the starting of a collecting action as soon as the social partners are bound by a collective agreement (the so called "social peace" clause). In order to limit to risk of social dumping after a national law case in 1989 21 , an amendment was added 1991 by the Parliament, allowing Trade Unions to implement collective actions against a foreign employer who would not comply with a Swedish collective agreement because he is already bound by a less protective collective agreement at home 22 . According to the ECJ, this Lex Britannia amendment displays unfair competition between national and foreign companies too. The national Court will finally decide whether Laval is entitled to compensations due to unfair treatment 23 . Preliminary negotiations set up by the Labour Court in order to come up with an agreement on the amount of the compensations have not been successful yet, while LO is still opposing the idea of having to pay a fine to Laval 24 .
Balancing economic freedoms and social rights in the EU
25
Before addressing the effects of the Laval case on the Swedish labour system, we must first account to the reasons why it has become, together with similar cases on the posting of workers 26 , one of the most controversial issues in recent European industrial and labour politics.
Ten new Member States mainly belonging to the Central European area joined the EU on the 1 st of May 2004, with their wage levels and labour provisions being respectively lower and weaker than those applying in the 15 Member States 27 . This imbalance created concerns about the risk that the full appliance of EC treaty rules on free movement to the new Member States would lead to "social dumping"
28 . The Laval case was thus depicted by Trade Unions and Left parties as a warning against the dangers of a full-fledged European-wide labour market. 26 , a couple of days before Laval. The Viking case deals with the posting of workers (here for a ferry-boat company) and the right for Trade Unions to take collective actions in order to prevent social dumping. The Viking line judgement is very much in line with the Laval case's one, since the Court said that any collective action -although legitimate -must not preclude the fulfilment of article 43 EC which guarantees the free movement of workers. A more recent case, Rüffert, has been ruled in a similar direction on the 3 rd of April 2008 by the ECJ. The German Land of Niedersaxen was convicted for displaying uneven conditions for competitive bidding, since local authorities asked foreign companies to comply with wage levels upon which social partner did not agree by a general available collective convention. The Laval case added to the political confusion throughout Europe, as the judicial proceedings occurred while the highly controversial directive on services was being drafted 29 . The first draft of the services directive was strongly deregulatory, triggering massive protests from Unionists, MEPs and governments 30 . The main bone of contention was the establishment of "the country of origin principle". This clause stated that a foreign provider coming from any EU State should have access to another Member States' market according to its home country rules, which was seen as opening the doors to a "run to the bottom" of labour legislations. This proposal was withdrawn from the final version of the directive, following the amendments agreed upon by the European Parliament and the Council. The 'Bolkenstein' draft initially amended the posted workers' directive, but the final version clearly distinguished both directives 31 . The temporary posting of workers remains thus unaffected by the directive 2006/123 EC on services. Nevertheless, the challenges and issues posed by the 'Bolkenstein' directive are similar to the ones the ECJ dealt with in its Laval ruling. The judgement does not explicitly imply that the Latvian labour law should apply to the Latvian workers who are posted in Sweden, but the labour law expert Stéphane Rodrigues fears that the Court's decision could "bring back [the country of origin principle] via the backdoor" by restricting the instances were the host Member State is allowed to regulate the posting of workers on its own territory 32 . Furthermore, the Laval case raises more general questions about the implementation of the EU legislations and its autonomy against primary EC law (i.e. treaties; Cavallini, 2007) . The directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers was indeed intended at protecting posted workers rights and enhancing host Member States' labour legislation, but its scope is limited and its implementation appears to be uncertain. The Court's judgement ruled that the scope of the directive cannot be extended beyond the set of minimum protection listed by the directive. If collective agreements exceed the list of minimum protection laid by the PWD, they have to pass the test of proportionality with regard to the fundamental freedoms and competition rules laid by the treaties. In this sense, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) argues that the directive does not actually provide a floor of protection that the host states must apply to the posted workers. It instead establishes a ceiling of employment conditions that the host states are allowed to extend to the posted workers 33 . Following the same line of thinking, EP Employment Committee's rapporteur on "Challenges to collective agreements in the EU" Jan Andersson (PSE, SE) said he was worried that the minimum conditions set out in the posting of workers directive might become maximum conditions 34 . The ECJ has displayed a strong commitment to guaranteeing the right to implement collective action in Europe as a way to protect fundamental rights, a stance that was welcomed by ETUC and by the main European parties
Medbestämmandelagen is directly applicable, which means in practice that the prohibition is not applicable to industrial action against a foreign undertaking which is temporarily active in
35 . Yet, many EC law experts voiced concerns about the Court's reference to proportionality requirements when it comes to implement collective actions (Bercusson, 2007) . One can indeed wonder what does proportionality actually mean when dealing with contradictory fundamental rights such as free movement on the one hand and protecting workers rights on the other. Although ECJ judges indicate that fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights need to be 'balanced' against each other, there still seem to be a clear hierarchy between the former and the latter: those exercising a freedom of movement do not have to justify their actions, whereas collective bargaining and collective actions have to be proven justified and proportionate to the fundamental rights they aim at protecting. Catherine Barnard provides an interesting long 36 . The same approach has been used by the Court in the Laval case ( §99), marking a substantial hierarchy between economic and social rights.
Securing collective agreements in the EU
The ECJ judges knew about the stakes of this landmark decision on the balance between EC freedoms and national employment rights and the Court itself was certainly strongly divided on this ruling. The conclusions of the General Advocate 37 and the ambiguity of the reasoning prove that the Grand Chamber came up with a tricky compromise 38 . Given the political turmoil around this case and the uncertainty regarding its long-term effects, one might thus expect a legislative response at EU level in order to secure national labour regulations and to bring politics back into this Court-led integration process. Yet, the reaction by Member States' representatives was more cautious about the possibility of redrafting the Posted Workers Directive than a majority of the European Parliament was. Interestingly, Sweden was among the most reluctant Member States. During the whole procedure however, the Swedish Trade Unions were officially supported by the Swedish government, but also by 15 Member States, most of them belonging to the former 'EU 15'. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were amongst the countries which complained about the hindrance to the community law on free movement 39 . It is not surprising that some Member States, especially the new ones, do not feel strong incentives to protect the Nordic collective agreements. publish a communication that would clarify the scope and the aims of the PWD. Although he said that Sweden was not willing to give up its model of labour relations, the Swedish Minister Sven-Otto Littorin was again elusive about those political initiatives, reminding that the ratification of the Lisbon treaty would provide a sufficient legal basis for protecting Member States against "social dumping". The Minister did not call on the Commission to launch a review of the EC legislation, but rather proposed to find a compromise with the ECJ 50 . As the next section will show, an investigation into Sweden's domestic labour market politics could be very helpful in order to better understand the "low-profile" attitude of the Swedish government at EU level while defending its collective agreements model. Likewise, an investigation into Sweden's internal affairs could be helpful in order to understand why the Laval case became for the social-democrats and the Trade Unions such a dramatized fight for the survival of "their" labour relations model.
LAVAL IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT: THE NOT-SO-HEALTHY LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN
The intrusion of EC law sparked off a lively debate about the future of the Swedish labour relations (Eklund, 2008) . The Laval dispute contributed to escalade distrust among social partners, while the government has to cope both with the combativeness of social democrats and with the heterogeneity of its centre-left coalition on such issues. Beyond the legal consequences of the Court's decision, the Laval case is a landmark dispute because it unveils and increases the turmoil of the Swedish autonomous labour regulations model itself. It highlights the current evolutions towards increasingly controversial social and industrial relations that could lead to the substitution of corporatist schemes either by a state-driven regulation or by a deregulation of the labour market. As many Europeans are looking to Scandinavia as a model of harmonious balance between competitiveness and social progress, these domestic issues give therefore to the Laval case a disastrous symbolic dimension. Above all, the Court's decision is a dramatic political and symbolic setback for the Swedish Trade Union LO and its ally the Social Democratic Party (SAP). Commenting on the ECJ decision, a person involved in both LO and the SAP said that "whatever happens now, the balance between employers and Unions is shifting away from us 51 ". LO and its affiliates strongly committed themselves in this dispute, pouring their prestige and extensive political resources (rallies, campaigns, expertise) in this fight. Despite the support of a large share of the public 52 and Sweden's main political party, they made several mistakes which indubitably benefited to the employers' Union 53 . By asking Laval to comply to Stockholm's region medium wage (instead of an approximate of the minimum wage), and by implementing a massive blockade, they had in fact little chance to convince the European Court that their action was both appropriate and necessary. Already in December 2004, Niklas Bruun, lecturer in EU-labour law was sceptical about the chances of LO-Byggnads' claims to be accepted by the Court 54 . Politically, the Swedish Unions appeared inflexible and dogmatic, far from the virtuous image of Swedish Unionism abroad. Moreover, LO and the former social-democrat labour Minister Hans Karlsson clearly did not quite get how much what they genuinely saw as a legitimate fight against social dumping was actually understood as sheer protectionism on the other side of the Baltic Sea. For example, LOByggnads did not find it necessary to cooperate from the beginning of the dispute with the Latvian workers' Union, a move which would have decreased the suspicion of protectionism 55 .
Byggnads made then clear that "the threat is not coming from the outside (…) but uncaring Swedish employers are taking advantage of the provisions for free movement of services, at the expense of posted workers' rights
56 ", but it was probably too late. Business organisations and liberals, although structurally weaker, suddenly had a say in the public debate, as they could voice their support to the discriminated-against Latvian posted workers 57 . The Swedish employers' confederation (Svenskt Näringsliv) provided lawyers and juridical assistance to the Latvian company during the entire trial. Although Svenskt Näringsliv's spokesman Anders Elmér kept saying that the purpose of this action was not to jeopardize the Swedish labour model 58 , the employers' confederation tried to take advantage of the decision in order to make the case that Unions were given an exorbitant power over industrial relations in Sweden. This dispute is thus likely to have further disturbing impacts on labour relations, especially as the social partner are going in the coming months to renegotiate the general labour convention "Saltsjöbadsavtalet", which is the cornerstone of the Swedish labour model 59 . The relations between unions and employers were already mitigated, "since the Laval case, they are literally freezing out", an employers' Unionist said 60 . The shrinking of Trade Unions' positions in industrial relations goes along with the wane of consensual labour regulations between social partners and the growing distrust between social partners. The Trade Unions have indeed much more to lose than the employers. According to LO, the Court's decision is a major risk for the corporatist system, since employers are now expected to seek confrontation instead of "buying out" social peace to the Unions (the term is used by LO). LO 51 " Efter Lavalmålet -Regeringen kan inte gömma sig bakom EU", LO,18-01-2008 52 According to a recent pool, 78% of the Swedish public believes that "it must be up to Sweden and not the EU to organise its own labour market", although the least one can say is that this question is far from being neutral… Source Dagens Nyheter, 20-12-2007 general secretary Hans Tilly said that he is concerned about the fact that an increasing number of Swedish building companies are already unwilling to comply local collective agreements. Indeed, while Trade Unions tend to become less influential, the employers' confederation has almost entirely withdrawn from tripartite corporatist bodies. We will now turn to the political context which is also of critical importance in order to understand the effects of the ECJ judgment.
A political strategy to crush the Unions?
Before he was elected Prime Minister in September 2006, the leader of the conservative party Fredrik Reinfeldt called Byggnads' action "a shame for LO" and accused the building Union to keep wages artificially high. His coalition partner Göran Hägglund, leader of the Christian-democratic and now Minister of social affairs, spoke about a "mafia"
61 . Disappointment was therefore high among Swedish liberals and the employers' federation when the new appointed Prime Minister chose to follow the footsteps of his social democratic predecessor and gave a full support to the Unions in the Laval case. Ever since this U-turn, there have been many conjectures about the true intentions of the government. The adverse judgement for the Swedish labour model gave to this question a critical importance, as the government is now given the opportunity to further reform the Swedish labour model. The relationship between the conservatives and the Trade Unions is rather ambiguous since Fredrik Reinfeldt turned the Party into a "new moderate" party (Nya moderaterna). Learning from the 1994 electoral defeat, Reinfeldt softened his neo-liberal attacks against the Welfare State and promoted a "blairist" model of workfare instead. However, social-democrats and Trade unionists voiced their suspicion about a so-called 'hidden agenda' against Trade Unions, especially when the government increased the fees for unemployment benefits which made Union-membership less attractive for workers 62 . Subsequently, more than 200 000 persons left the Unions in a couple of months. During the past decade, Unionmembership figures have already dropped significantly from 85% to roughly 75% of all the workers 63 . The Swedish Unions have long been able to cope with workers disaffection, mainly by providing pecuniary advantages and services such as unemployment insurances (A-kassan). This reform was thus seen by many unionists as an explicit attempt to further weaken their organisations. The spokesman of the white-collars Union TCO, Sture North, lamented on the ongoing domestic changes affecting the Unions: "Our provisions to protect workers are solely based on collective conventions (…) it only works if we [the Unions] are influential enough 64 ". Indeed, the Laval decision hits Swedish Unions at a time when they are suffering one of the most acute crises of their history. In this context, we will now try to investigate its consequences for the governance of labour regulations in Sweden.
THE LAVAL DECISION AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFORM LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS
Swedish labour regulations will have to be adjusted to EC law in response to the ECJ ruling. But how far? Our argument is that the ambiguity of the ruling -as it is often the case -allows the domestic actors to make an extensive usage of Europe and to claim more changes that are actually made necessary by the judgement. Likewise, the absence of domestic legislative reaction could also be another usage of Europe by undermining the position of Trade Unions on the longer run. The Laval case opens new opportunities for those who advocate a broad reform of the labour market. The liberal columnist Per Dahl believes that "it is time to break Unions' monopoly on social relations" and sees the Laval judgment as an opportunity for Sweden to get closer to the "European model"
65 . Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the Swedish authorities will use the Laval 'momentum' in order to alter the autonomous collective agreement model and to introduce a sort of system shift towards either an 'Anglo-Saxon' deregulation, a 'continental' state-led regulation of the labour market, or a 'hybrid collective agreement model' like in other Scandinavian and Nordic countries. The latter option is favoured by the Laval Committee which was appointed by the government and remitted its report on the "changes in Swedish legislation (that) need to be made as a result of the Laval judgment 66 ". Whatever decision will finally be made by the government following the case, it will not be neutral on the longer run for the power-balance between Trade Union and employers on the one hand and between social partner and the State on the other.
Collective action under scrutiny: how to translate the EC proportionality principle into domestic labour regulation?
LO-Byggnads lost the ECJ case against Laval because its collective action was deemed disproportionate with regard to its objective of protecting the workers. Beyond this particular case, Isabell Olsson pointed out the differences between the EC principle of proportionality and the customary "assessments of proportionality" as driven by the Swedish Courts (Olsson, 2007) . The transposition of the EC principle of proportionality into the Swedish labour relations poses a threat to the autonomous collective agreement system. As Brian (Bercusson, 2007) . The Laval case could thus open new opportunities for those who were dissatisfied with the customary way to assess the proportionality of collective agreements. The employers' confederation Svenskt Näringsliv has for a long time called on governments to limit the scope of collective actions, and especially the so-called "secondary" or "sympathy" actions (sympatiåtgärder) 67 , which means blockades and strikes implemented by other Trade Unions or workers in order to make a specific action more efficient (art. 41 MBL). Sympathy actions are most of the time implemented by LO-affiliates, as it was the case with the electricians' Union helping Byggnads to blockade Laval although it was not part of the dispute in the first place. Already in 2005, before the ruling of the case, the employers' confederation Svenskt Näringsliv released a report "Den Svenska modellen har kantrat" ('the Swedish model changed direction') which listed seven measures in order to limit to possibilities for Unions to implement an industrial action 68 . By chance, one of the propositions deals with the implementation of a "proportionality rule" with would control the effects of a collective action on social partners and third persons. Liberals and conservative tried to change to labour regulations when they came to office. The labour market Commission (Arbetmarknadsutkottet) recently released a report on the introduction of an operative "principle of proportionality" which would be able to balance the objectives of collective actions and their actual effects on the economy 69 . Any attempt to introduce a more restrictive "principle of proportionality" in the Labour law has been unsuccessful so far 70 . Beyond the question of proportionality, let us turn to the practical reforms of the Swedish labour legislation that could be implemented in response to the Laval judgement and to their possible consequences for the future of the collective agreement model. To act or not to act? The Swedish labour governance at the crossroads Only a few collective conventions are directly put under pressure by the ECJ decision, namely those dealing with posted workers. Sweden will now have to grant a better access of posted workers to its collective agreement system. It is now unanimously acknowledged that the Swedish collective convention system is lacking transparency, especially for foreign companies. As an example, the local agreement that Laval refused to sign was a 170 pages long document. Moreover, the "Lex Britannia" amendment will have to be abrogated, as it is too obviously discriminatory against foreign employers. This is enough to have potential disruptive effects on the whole system of labour market regulation. The Trade Unions demand sufficient guarantees about the appliance of collective agreements to foreign companies. The key question is now whether the authorities will be able to control on a non discriminatory basis the posting of foreign workers without affecting the autonomy of social partners. According to Sture North, the compliance to the Laval decision is an interesting issue because it forces the government to take a clear stance and to decide whether or not it is willing to support the corporatist system: "If it is what the government wants, so can we easily deal with [the ECJ decision] 71 ". After having stated that the government is not going to take any decision soon, the Minister of labour Sven Otto Littorin faced the criticisms from unionists and social-democrats who urged the Swedish government to launch a legislative process in order to cope with the decision. 78 . The labour market researcher Svante Nycander does not share this optimistic stance. According to him, the introduction of minimal wage standards would necessarily recast the corporatist system into a stateregulated labour market as it is the case in France or a court-driven system as in Britain 79 . Referring to the famous "free rider" theory, Nils Karlsson and Henrik Lindberg fear that an increased input of politicians on wage regulations would accelerate the decline of Unions' membership and thus lead to the destruction of th 80 e social consensus . A second option for reshaping the Swedish labour law in accordance with EC community law would be, following other Nordic countries, to set by law an automatic application system of collective conventions 81 . This system seems to be the nearest to the current Swedish model and would thus allow a minimal change in order to comply with the ECJ decision. The former Prime Minister Göran Persson already referred to this option as a possible "fall-back strategy" if the Swedish system was turned down by the Court. Whereas a legal automatic extension of collective agreements is expected to be less endangering the labour relations, some Trade Union leaders and social scientists claim with Bo Rönngren that "both alternatives are going to undermine the Unions' influence on the labour market" 82 . They believe that workers would not feel the urge to be member of a Trade Union in order to benefit from the general applicable collective agreement system. Taking France as an example, Svante Nycander argues that this cognitive shift would lead to a "free rider" mechanism too. As the Trade Unions' membership will drop, their political stance will necessarily become less consensual, and Unions will tend to only defend "insiders" interests, as it is allegedly the case in 84 ". A third method, the Committee argued, is thus to reinforce the responsibility of social partners in the regulation of social relations. The Lew Britannia amendment shall be abrogated and the principle of mutual recognition must apply fully to foreign collective agreements. The law on labour regulation (MLB) would be left almost unchanged. Only the items that are not included in the "hard core" of the Posting of Workers Directive (e.g. night shifts, working hours, breaks…) would be withdrawn from the collective agreements applicable to foreign companies (and thus could not lead to a collective action in case of non compliance). However, social partners will continue to be set up and enforce minimum rates of pay and other minimum conditions within the 'hard core' that are to be applied for a particular category of posted workers according to the central and nationwide collective agreement applicable to the sector. Foreign employers would thus be asked to comply with the Swedish collective agreements, while Swedish Trade Unions would have to set more predictable and transparent rules on wage-setting. In order to help them in this task, the Committee's proposes to reinforce the role of the "liaison office", the Swedish Lavaldomen, SOU 2008:123 Work Environment Authority, which "aims to simplify matters, both for foreign employers and workers, regarding the obtaining of information about the conditions and requirements applicable upon a posting to Sweden 85 ". The Laval Committee clearly chose to support the autonomy of Trade Unions. But this proposal provides a thin guarantee to prevent another ECJ reference. It mainly builds upon the responsibility of the Swedish Trade Unions and could thus be a two-edged sword for the autonomous labour system if they do not fulfil the need for transparency and openness. We pointed out above that the Laval case did not arise at random, but in a very specific context of increasingly conflicting labour relations. One can thus argue that trust amongst labour market organisations can hardly be decided from above. The tensions that caused the Laval case are thus likely to arise again soon or later unless/until the Directive on Posted Workers is redrafted.
Bercusson pointed it, "it's in the very nature of negotiations that both parties set demands at their highest and through negotiation over time seek a compromise […] At what stage of this process and against what criteria is the test of proportionality to be applied?"
CONCLUSION
Although the Laval case is most likely to trigger a formally limited reform of the Swedish labour regulations in the short run, we pointed out that it is a factor of toughening the relations between the State, the employers and the Unions. Following Ferrera and Rhodes' analysis on the Welfare State (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000) , we argue that a "recasting" of industrial relations is occurring in Sweden, combining European constraints and incentives as well as domestically generated social and political changes. Jonas Malmberg expressed this idea with dramatic words during his hearing at the European Parliament: "In the shadow of the internal market a territorial struggle is in progress over where labour law ends and economic rules take over 86 ". Indeed, this article pointed out the juridical constraints, the political opportunities and the mechanisms of interaction which explain why the trade-off between EC economic and social rights at EU level directly affects the domestic balance between the State, the employers and the Trade Unions. The main result of this investigation is that the Laval judgment created new incentive for reforming labour regulations in Sweden, firstly because it accelerates the decline of Trade Unions which are the central actors of autonomous collective agreements. Secondly, it creates an immediate opportunity to change the Swedish labour regulations, beyond the legal adjustments that the judgement requires. The ambiguity of the ruling and the complexity of the Swedish labour model opened a wide range of political choices for the government. If the labour Minister follows the final report of the Laval committee that he commissioned in April 2008, the government is rather unlikely to implement a system shift either towards the continental or the Anglo-Saxon models. The usages of the Laval case by social actors and by the government are a decisive factor for the future of the Swedish labour model. We highlighted at least two strong patterns so far: the employers and the government made a spectacular political breakthrough in promoting a stronger legal supervision over labour relations, while Trade Unions and social-democrats seem to be trapped in a dilemma. On the one hand, a more active State intervention would put Trade Unions at risk of loosing their role as a central institution of labour regulations. But, on the other hand, there is a risk of juridical uncertainty and potential social dumping if the Swedish labour law is not thoroughly revised. To the eyes of many European observers, the Laval case highlighted the inner troubles of the Swedish labour model and the need for a more coherent EU social legislation. But will Nordic Trade Unions and social-democratic parties become less reluctant to the idea of a continental-inspired "social Europe" featuring a pan-European minimum wage 87 ? There is simply so far no evidence that the Laval case had any impact in that respect. 
